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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
RONNIE LEE GARDNER,
Case No. 910500

Petitioner-Appellee
and Cross-Appellant,
v.

Category 3

TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden
of the Utah State Prison,
State of Utah,
Respondent-Appel1ant
and Cross-Appellee.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER-APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT
Ronnie Lee Gardner, Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-Appellant
herein, was the petitioner in the district court and will be
referred to by name or as the Petitioner. Respondent-Appellant and
Cross-Appellee, the State of Utah, will be referred to as the
prosecution or the State.

In references to the record, "T.lf will

refer to the transcript of Mr. Gardner's preliminary hearing and
trial, and "H." will refer to the transcript of the evidentiary
hearing conducted in the district court on November 27 and 28,
1990.
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The State appeals from a decision of the Salt Lake County
District Court granting in part a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus and/or

for Postconviction Relief

Gardner, and vacating his death sentence.

filed by Ronnie Lee
The district court

granted relief on the grounds that Mr. Gardner received ineffective
1

assistance at sentencing, due to counsel's failure to investigate
and present mitigating evidence, and on direct appeal. Mr. Gardner
cross-appeals from the district court's decision to deny his
petition on other grounds.

The Court has jurisdiction over this

appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the district court correctly conclude that trial

counsel provided ineffective assistance, based on its findings of
fact that they unreasonably waited until after the guilty verdict
to seek mental health mitigating evidence, and never obtained
psychological, neurological or medical testing or investigated the
probability that Mr. Gardner suffered from organic brain damage?
2*

Did the district court correctly determine that Mr.

Gardner received ineffective assistance on direct appeal, under the
following circumstances: appellate counsel did not raise important
issues; the original appellate attorneys worked in the same public
defender's office as trial counsel; the replacement appellate
attorney represented a co-defendant in the case; the replacement
attorney

was

not

accurately

informed

of

the

scope

of

his

representation; original appellate counsel continued to submit
documents although they had been removed from the case because of
conflicts;

and

original

appellate

counsel

wrote

briefs

and

petitions on the issue of ineffective assistance of the public
defenders and submitted them to replacement counsel for filing?
3.

When a court in postconviction review determines that a

defendant under a death sentence received ineffective assistance of
2

appellate counsel for the reasons discussed above, must he be
allowed

an appeal with effective assistance

from

independent

counsel?
4.

Did trial counsel provide effective assistance in this

capital case when, in addition to the grounds found by the district
court:

(1) they were witnesses at the scene of Mr. Gardner's

arrest and their theory of defense depended on establishing their
client's mental

and physical

states at that

time, yet they

continued to represent him in violation of the witness-advocate
rule; (2) they had conflicts of interest due to their relationships
with the State's witnesses and due to the development of animosity
between them and their client; (3) they failed to ensure the
preservation of an adequate record of the trial and related
matters, including Mr. Gardner's requests that they withdraw; (4)
they did not adequately investigate and present their theory of
defense; (5) they failed to object to inadmissible hypnoticallyenhanced testimony; (6) they unreasonably decided that Mr. Gardner
should testify and exerted undue pressure to gain his acquiescence;
(7) in their client's testimony, they introduced the fact that he
had been convicted of numerous felonies, which were inadmissible
under Utah Rule of Evidence 609; (8) they failed to object or to a
request

a bifurcated

procedure to deal with the aggravating

circumstance that Mr. Gardner "was previously convicted of . . . a
felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person," under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1 )(h);

(9) they stipulated

to the

existence of an aggravating circumstance, without their client's
3

permission; (8) they never investigated the constitutional validity
the prior convictions used against their client; (9) they did not
challenge the use of an aggravating circumstance alleged by the
State, although there was authority available to argue that it did
not apply; and (10) they did not request personal voir dire, or
request an opening statement in the penalty phase?
5.

Should a conviction and death sentence be vacated when

they are based on inherently unreliable, hypnotically-enhanced
testimony from the State's central witness?
6.

In a capital case, should the defendant receive an

advisement from the court concerning his rights to testify or
remain silent, and matters affecting the decision whether to take
the stand?

May trial counsel in a capital case coerce the

defendant into testifying?
7.

Was Mr. Gardner's right to presence violated when the

trial court conducted hearings on motions in his absence?
8.

Was the Utah Constitution's requirement of a reasoned and

reliable capital sentencing proceeding violated when the State was
allowed

to disclose and argue evidence of the victim's good

character, but Mr, Gardner was not permitted to present testimony
in mitigation from the victim's friends and relatives that the
victim would have wanted him to receive a life sentence?
9.
the trial

Can the death penalty be constitutionally imposed when
court

fails to instruct

jurors on

all

applicable

mitigating circumstances listed in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)?
10.

Should

jurors

in

a capital
4

case

be

instructed

in

accordance with State v, Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 84 & n.10 cert, denied,
459 U.S. 988 (Utah 1982), that the State must establish the
existence of any aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt?
11.

Where a petitioner convicted of a capital crime and

sentenced to death files a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
and/or

for

Postconviction

Relief

asserting

that

he

received

ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, does the postconviction
court

commit

error

and

violate

the United

States

and

Utah

constitutions in refusing to appoint expert witnesses and an
investigator to assist him in preparing and presenting the case?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented in Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 are based on
trial and appellate counsel's ineffective assistance.

Issues of

ineffective assistance of counsel are mixed questions of law and
fact.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); State v.

Tempi in. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).

The factual components of

the question are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard,
requiring this court to grant great deference to the trial court's
findings of fact. State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987).
In addressing legal components, this Court applies the "correction
of error" standard and is not required to view the trial court's
rulings with deference.

Tempiin. 805 P. 2d at 186.

The issues presented in Questions 5, 7, 8 and 9 also appear to
be mixed questions of law and fact.

The issues presented in

Questions 6, 10 and 11 address questions of constitutional rights,
5

statutory interpretation or conclusions of law, and are reviewed
under the "correction of error" standard.

State v. James. 819 P.

2d 781, 796 P. 2d (Utah 1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, and the corollary provisions of the
Utah Constitution, are relevant to this appeal.

The Fifth

Amendment provides in pertinent part that:
[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
The Sixth Amendment provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense.
The Eighth Amendment states that:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.
The Fourteenth Amendment states in pertinent part that:
. . . [N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution provides that:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.

6

Article I, § 9 of the Utah Constitution provides that:
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive
fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned
shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution states in pertinent part:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall
nay accused person, before final judgment, be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. . . .
Other constitutional and statutory provisions and court rules will
be referred to as necessary in the text of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In October 1985, Mr. Gardner was tried by a Salt Lake County
jury on charges of First Degree Murder, Attempted First Degree
Murder, Aggravated Kidnapping, Escape and Possession of a Dangerous
Weapon by an Incarcerated Person.

On October 22, 1985, the jury

found him guilty as charged, and in the penalty phase of trial,
conducted on October 24 and 25, 1985, decided that he should be
executed.

The trial court's judgment sentencing Mr. Gardner to

death was entered on October 25, 1985.x

1

On the non-capital offenses, Mr. Gardner received two
terms of five years to life and two sentences of one to 15 years in
the Utah State Prison, with each sentence to be served
consecutively.
7

On January 31, 1989, this Court rejected the issues raised on
direct appeal and affirmed Mr. Gardner's conviction and sentence.
Gardner v. State. 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 494 U.S.
1090 (1990).

Rehearing was denied on November 15, 1989. On April

16, 1990, the United States Supreme Court denied Mr. Gardner's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
On June 29, 1990, the district court set an execution date of
August 24, 1990.

On the same date, undersigned counsel were

appointed to represent Mr. Gardner on a volunteer basis, with the
court ruling that they were not entitled to compensation for their
work on his behalf.

On July 16, 1990, Mr. Gardner filed his

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or for Postconviction
Relief.

On August 8, 1990, the district court granted a stay of

execution.
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno conducted an evidentiary hearing
on November 27 and 28, 1990. After the submission of briefs from
Mr. Gardner and the State, Judge Uno issued his decision on July
26, 1990.

Judge Uno held that Mr. Gardner was entitled to a new

sentencing hearing and to a new direct appeal because he had
received ineffective assistance of counsel at those stages of the
case.

Relief on all other grounds was denied.

The State's Motion for New Trial was filed on August 5, 1991
and denied on October 7, 1991.

The State's Notice of Appeal was

filed on October 28, 1991, and Mr. Gardner's Notice of Cross-Appeal
was timely filed thereafter.

8

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This case arose from a highly publicized incident at the
Metropolitan Hall of Justice on April 2, 1985.

On that morning,

Mr. Gardner was brought from the Utah State Prison to attend a
court hearing in a murder case, known as the "Cheers" case.

Mr.

Gardner was represented in that other case by Andrew Valdez and
James Valdez, two brothers who worked as lawyers in the Salt Lake
Legal Defenders Association.
As the prison guards brought him into the lobby in the
basement of the courthouse, a woman appeared and handed a gun to
Mr. Gardner.

In an exchange of gunfire as the guards left the

building, Mr. Gardner was shot in the chest, through his lung. In
looking for an exit, Mr. Gardner entered a file room where attorney
Michael Burdell was shot. After shooting a uniformed bailiff who
confronted him, Mr. Gardner was led from the basement by a prison
officer.

He compelled a vending machine serviceman to walk with

him outside the building, where he then collapsed on the lawn.
At

the same time, Andrew Valdez and

James Valdez were

approaching the courthouse for the scheduled motions hearing.

As

Andrew Valdez was crossing the street to the courthouse:
I looked across the street, I saw Ronnie in the plaza
area of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice. He went down,
I couldn't hear what was going on because the sirens
were, there was all kinds of commotion. And he went down
on the lawn, and I ran across the street and saw that he
was bleeding from the chest area.
(H. 113).

Andrew Valdez was told by a prison officer that Mr.

Gardner had killed a lawyer, and his first thought was that his
9

brother, James, had been shot.

(H. 114). Mr. Valdez went to Mr.

Gardner on the courthouse lawn and asked him about James.
response, Mr. Gardner asked to be taken to a hospital.

In

Andrew

Valdez was removed from the scene by a detective, and was the first
person Mr. Gardner recognized after collapsing on the lawn.

(H.

74, 113-14).
James Valdez also observed Mr. Gardner at the scene of his
arrest.

As Mr. Valdez arrived at the courthouse in his car, he

heard sirens and saw Mr. Gardner on the lawn.

(H. 193-94).

He

immediately approached Mr. Gardner and asked about his brother,
Andrew.

Mr. Valdez was afraid that Andrew had been harmed, not

necessarily by Mr. Gardner.

(H. 194). Mr. Gardner said that he

did not know where Andrew was. Mr. Valdez also testified that he
inquired whether Mr. Gardner was okay, and Mr. Gardner said he was
in some pain.

(H. 194-95).

Mr. Valdez then was ordered behind a

barricade, but he continued to observe until Mr. Gardner was
removed from the scene.

(H. 196).

In the guilt phase of trial, counsel's theory of defense was
that Mr. Gardner had not intended to kill Michael Burdell, and that
the shooting was "essentially a reaction, a reaction after having
been shot."

(H. 131).

Trial testimony from Robert Macri, a

witness to the shooting as well as a friend and colleague of Mr.
Burdell, was "devastating" to this defense. (H. 141). After the
preliminary hearing and before trial, Mr. Macri was hypnotized at
his request, in an attempt to remember more details about the
incident.
10

Counsel did not withdraw despite the fact that they were
witnesses to the effects of the shooting on Mr. Gardner.

At the

hearing conducted by the district court, Andrew Valdez testified
that he did not believe his presence at the scene created a
conflict.
sure

(H. 137-138).

whether

he

James Valdez testified that he was not

considered

"apparently" decided not to.

being

a

witness,

and

that

he

(H. 198, 199).

The record does not contain any waiver by Mr. Gardner of his
right to conflict-free counsel.

The transcripts and clerk's file

also lack any record of Mr. Gardner's requests that counsel
withdraw.

Testimony from Mr. Gardner and from counsel confirms

that he asked them at least twice to withdraw prior to trial. One
such request occurred on the Friday before trial, and was brought
to the trial judge's attention, apparently off-the-record.

(H. 86-

87, 127-28).
In addition to failing to withdraw because they were witnesses
at the scene, trial counsel did not take steps necessary to present
their theory of defense.

Counsel did not obtain ballistics

evidence about the impact of the gunshot, and they failed to
correct witnesses' erroneous testimony that Mr. Gardner was wounded
in the shoulder rather than in his chest and lung.
The State relied upon three aggravating circumstances in the
guilt phase of trial.

One was the circumstance set forth in Utah

Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1 )(h), and the State therefore was required to
prove that Mr. Gardner had been previously convicted of a violent
felony. Counsel did not request a bifurcated procedure to address
11

the prejudicial impact of revealing this information to the jury
before it has considered whether he is guilty or not guilty of the
acts charged.
In fact,

at

the beginning

of

the guilt

phase,

counsel

stipulated without Mr. Gardner's permission to the existence of two
convictions satisfying § 76-5-202(l)(h).

(T. 766); (H. 93).

Further, counsel did not investigate thoroughly

to determine

whether these convictions were constitutionally obtained. They did
not review transcripts of Mr. Gardner's pleas or talk to his
previous attorneys.

(H. 223).

Mr. Gardner testified at trial, but believed that counsel
coerced him into taking the stand.

(H. 90). Counsel then elicited

testimony from Mr. Gardner describing prior felony convictions
including two robberies, attempted escape, burglary, two aggravated
assaults and homicide.

(T. 1186-87).

Counsel believed that

disclosing Mr. Gardner's felony record was necessary to "steal the
thunder" from the prosecution, which would be entitled to introduce
the information in cross-examination. (H.149).
Counsel called Mr. Gardner as a witness despite their belief
that his testimony in the guilt phase would open the door to
impeachment with his prior felony convictions and to rebuttal
testimony from Wayne Jorgensen.2 (H. 148, 152).
2

Jorgensen was a prison guard who claimed that, while
hospitalized after the shooting, Mr. Gardner admitted that he
intentionally killed Michael Burdell. At the State's request, the
district court below ruled that the issue of ineffective assistance
of counsel in respect to Jorgensen's testimony had been resolved on
appeal, See 789 P. 2d at 288, and therefore is exhausted for
purposes of any federal court review.
12

On October 22, 1985, the jury found Mr. Gardner guilty of
first degree murder.

Counsel then obtained a one-day recess to

prepare for the penalty phase of trial.
expert

testimony

to

explain

Counsel had not obtained

psychiatric,

psychological

or

neurological conditions affecting Mr. Gardner.
In the day following the guilty verdict, counsel arranged for
Mr. Gardner's evaluation by Dr. Peter Heinbecker.

In the 24 hours

before he testified, Dr. Heinbecker was able only to interview Mr.
Gardner for about one hour, to spend a total of two-and-a-half
hours with his mother and brother and to review some records.
These records did not include the results of current psychological
and neurological testing, because counsel had not sought these
tests.

Dr.

Heinbecker

testified

that,

in

a

case

of

this

significance, he would have expected more time to prepare his
evaluation.

(H. 214). The doctor "tried to pick out . . . general

factors that were important," and found in old records " some
evidence of organic brain damage."

(T. 1577).

However, Dr.

Heinbecker was cross-examined effectively by the prosecutor, whose
questions established the deficiencies in the rushed, incomplete
evaluation.
On direct appeal, Mr. Gardner continued to be represented by
the Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association, and specifically by
lawyers including Andrew Valdez and James Valdez.
However, Mr. Gardner became dissatisfied with his appellate
representation, and requested that counsel withdraw.
eventually granted this request.
13

This Court

The following findings of fact

from the district court describe what occurred:
Mr. Ed Brass was appointed to replace the Salt Lake Legal
Defenders Association based on petitioner's claim he received
ineffective appeal. Mr. Brass filed a supplemental brief
arguing there was no evidentiary record to frame the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition/ it is not
contested that Mr. Brass was appointed by the Supreme Court's
order, a copy of which order he claims not to have received,
to file a supplemental brief to address matters not previously
addressed. Consequently, based on a telephone conversation
with Chief Justice Hall, he understood he was appointed only
to address the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel at
trial. Mr. Brass claims to not have received a copy of its
opinion.
A further problem exists.
The Supreme Court's order discharging the Salt Lake County
Legal Defenders Association was not scrupulously honored.
Attorney Joan Watt testified she was instructed in an informal
telephone call from the Supreme Court's clerk to file the
appropriate documents in Mr. Gardner's behalf after the
decision affirming his conviction and sentence was announced.
Although the Supreme Court had decided that he was entitled to
independent counsel on the ineffective assistance issue, Ms.
Watt also prepared the Supplemental Petition for Rehearing and
supplemental reply to State's Response to Appellant's Petition
for Rehearing, which were signed and filed by Mr. Brass.
Memorandum Decision at 28.
The district court concluded that Mr. Gardner did not receive
effective, conflict-free representation on appeal.
Additional facts will be referred to as necessary in the
Argument section of this brief.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district
received

court correctly concluded

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel

that Mr. Gardner
in

his

capital

sentencing because counsel did not adequately or timely investigate
and present mental health evidence.

The court's findings of fact

on this issue were based in part on its assessment of witness
14

credibility, and are supported by the record. Recognizing that Mr.
Gardner's ability to establish prejudice was thwarted by the
State's objection to the provision of expert

witnesses, the

district court also determined that counsel' s deficient performance
met the second prong of the ineffective assistance standard of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

The State has not

established that the court clearly erred in its factual resolutions
underlying the decision that Mr. Gardner is entitled to a new
sentencing

hearing

because

trial

counsel

were

ineffective.

Further, the district court correctly concluded that counsel's
actions and omissions were unreasonable.
The State also has not satisfied

the clearly erroneous

standard of review concerning the district court' s factual findings
in support of its determination that Mr. Gardner's appellate
counsel provided ineffective assistance.
In ruling on the remaining grounds supporting Mr. Gardner's
claim that trial counsel were ineffective, the district court
applied an incorrect standard of prejudice under the second prong
of Strickland v. Washington.

The court erred in requiring Mr.

Gardner to establish that counsel's deficiencies were prejudicial
"beyond a reasonable doubt."

In addition, the court clearly erred

in finding that Mr. Gardner waived his right to conflict-free
counsel at trial, particularly with respect to counsel's violation
of the witness-advocate rule.
The district court erroneously concluded that only harmless
error

resulted

form

the

admission
15

of

hypnotically-enhanced

testimony from Robert Macri at trial. A review of the record shows
that Mr. Macrifs testimony, and its alteration followed hypnosis,
was significant rather than cumulative and unimportant.
The court below also erred in ruling that there was not need
for an advisement from the trial court on Mr. Gardner's right to
testify or remain silent at trial, and that his right to presence
was not violated.
The district court erroneously concluded that references to
the victim's character and the impact of his death were not
sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict, and that any
error was harmless.
The district court wrongly decided that the omission of a jury
instruction defining the mitigating circumstance of duress under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2) was not error.
The court below also committed an error of law in concluding
that the trial judge was not required to give an instruction
stating

that

the prosecution

had

the burden

of proving

the

existence of aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
Mr. Gardner's ability to present his case throughout this
postconviction proceeding has been thwarted by the district court's
refusal to appoint defense investigators and expert witnesses. The
lack of expert and investigative assistance has resulted in a
hearing which was not full and fair, and violates Mr. Gardner's
rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and Article I, §§7, 9 and 12 of the
Utah Constitution.
16

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT MR. GARDNER
RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN THE SENTENCING
PHASE OF THIS CAPITAL CASE.
The right to counsel is one of the bedrock principles of

American criminal jurisprudence. Because representation by counsel
is essential to guarantee other constitutional privileges, the
Sixth Amendment is not satisfied unless counsel plays "the role
necessary to ensure that the trial is fair."
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).

Strickland v.

Therefore, "the right to

counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel."

McMann

v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n.14 (1970).
Ineffective assistance of counsel is established when the
record demonstrates that the attorney's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness considering the circumstances
of the case, and that the accused was prejudiced by the incompetent
representation. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 692; State v. Frame,
723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (Per curiam). To demonstrate that he
was prejudiced by counsel's error, the defendant must show a
"reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different"
in the absence of deficient performance. "A reasonable probability
is a

probability

outcome."

sufficient

to undermine

confidence

in the

466 U.S. at 694; 723 P.2d at 405.

The nature of the case as a capital proceeding is one of the
circumstances to be considered in evaluating claims of ineffective
assistance.

In Strickland, the Court recognized that

ff

[w]hen a

defendant challenges a death sentence . . . , the question is
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whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent [counsel's]
errors, the sentence . . . would have concluded that the balance of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death."
466 U.S. at 695.
A higher standard of competence is not required of counsel in
a capital case. However, the potential severity of the punishment
is a factor to be evaluated in determining whether counsel's
performance was reasonable under the circumstances.
U.S.

at

666;

concurring).

Strickland,

466 U.S. at

704-06

Cronic, 466

(Brennan,

J.,

According to the Tenth Circuit, "In a capital case

the attorney's duty to investigate all possible lines of defense is
strictly observed."

Coleman v. Brown. 802 F.2d 1227, 1233 (10th

Cir. 1986).
Because the nature and substance of the penalty phase trial
"differ[s] radically in form and in issues addressed from those
about

the commission

of a crime....

[c]apital

cases require

perceptions, attitudes, preparation, training, skills that ordinary
criminal defense attorneys may lack." G. Goodpaster, The Trial for
Life:

Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases. 58

N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299, 303-04 (1983).

The investigation, discovery,

preparation and presentation of mitigating evidence is the most
critical function of the defense in a capital case.
In this appeal, the State challenges the district court's
conclusion

that

counsel

provided

sentencing

because they failed

present mitigating evidence.

ineffective

to adequately

assistance

at

investigate and

After receiving evidence from Mr.
18

Gardner,

trial

counsel

and

mental

health

professionals,

and

necessarily weighing their credibility in resolving conflicts in
their testimony, Judge Uno found that:
Primarily, there was inadequate investigation relating to
petitioner's mental health prior to trial.
Whatever
evidence was presented was inadequate—too little and too
late. There is dispute regarding Dr. Peter Heinbecker's
testimony.
Was there sufficient time and sufficient
medical or psychological evaluations for Dr. Heinbecker
to adequately and completely testify in behalf of
petitioner? The Court is of the opinion there was not.
Dr. Heinbecker was contacted a mere 24 hours before he
testified.
***

Dr. Mark Rindflesh, a psychiatrist, evaluated
petitioner in May 1985. He apparently was not asked to
testify for petitioner. . . .Dr. Agnes Plenk was asked
to evaluate or testify in behalf of petitioner, but she
declined.
No further effort was made to seek
professional assistance for petitioner, nor seek State
assistance in doing so. In addition, present counsel's
efforts to secure expert testimony for petitioner's
evaluation was opposed by the State and sustained by this
Court.
As a result, no satisfactory mental health
evaluation of petitioner has ever been available to
petitioner to present at any hearing.
Petitioner contends the deprivation of adequate
evaluations has prevented petitioner from presenting any
evidence of possible organic brain damage or other
mitigating
information
which
further
prevented
presentation of "a cohesive and understandable theory of
mitigation," The Court agrees.
Memorandum Decision, at 23-24.

The court also found that Mr.

Gardner was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, and
therefore ordered a new sentencing hearing.
Ignoring the findings of fact in Judge Uno's ruling, the State
contends in this Court that it lacks support in the record.
According to the State, "The evidence demonstrates that trial
counsel expended every reasonable effort to find a psychological
expert to testify on petitioner's behalf." (Brief of Appellant, at
19

12).

This argument is refuted by a review of the record and the

factual findings made by Judge Uno.

The State cannot meet its

burden of establishing that the district court's findings are
clearly erroneous.
In its opening brief, the State presents only selected facts,
contrary to it obligation to identify the evidence supporting the
trial court's findings.

See State v. Larsen, 828 P. 2d 487, 491

(Utah App. 1992) [(citing Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 817
P.2d 789 (Utah 1991)].

In Larsen, the court of appeals stated

that:
To prove that the trial courts findings of fact were
clearly erroneous, "an appellant must marshall all evidence in
favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then
demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings of fact." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P. 2d
198, 199-200 (Utah 1991). If an appellant fails to marshall
the evidence, "the appellate court assumes that the record
supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a
review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law
and the application of that law in the case." Id. at 199.
828 P. 2d at 490
There was no reasonable justification for the delay in seeking
psychiatric or psychological evidence in mitigation. Andrew Valdez
attempted to justify this delay by claiming that it was caused by
the reluctance of expert witnesses to become involved in the case.
However, the district court below made a finding of fact that the
defense

efforts

to

obtain

expert

assistance

were

limited,

inconsistent with Mr. Valdez' testimony, and therefore rejected his
attempted explanation.
Dr. Mark Rindflesh was asked by counsel to evaluate Mr.
20

Gardner shortly after the incident. He interviewed Mr. Gardner for
approximately one hour during a barrier visit at the Utah State
Prison on May 10, 1985. Dr. Rindflesh then wrote to Andrew Valdez
a letter which included the following:
I suspect the critical issue in trying to
present as favorable a picture of Mr. Gardner
as possible to the jury will be whether or not
he has a conscience.
Does he really feel
remorse for his action?
If he is so very
impulsive and acts without thinking he may
well feel sorry later. I did not try to get
into this area of discussion since I was
talking to him via telephone and could only
see him through a small window. Discussing a
subject such as this requires the opportunity
to receive the nonverbal communication as well
as the verbal. Perhaps an interview in a more
open setting will be possible in the future.
(Exhibit P-l). However, Andrew Valdez testified that Dr. Rindflesh
was reluctant to testify in his behalf.

(H. 126).

Andrew Valdez also testified that he and co-counsel then
discussed Mr. Gardner and the reports they had obtained with Dr.
Agnes Plenk, a child psychologist.

According to Mr. Valdez, "we

thought she was going to come down and do a personal interview and
any other assessments necessary, and she backed out at the last
minute.11

Mr. Valdez testified that Dr. Plenk "just didn't want to

be associated with the case."

(H. 121). Mr. Valdez also said:

We then contacted, I believe we contacted
another doctor, and that could have been Dr.
Lebegue or another doctor, but we found
problems
getting
people
to
associate
themselves with the case, because of the
nature of the publicity and things of that
nature.
(H. 122) (Emphasis added).
This attempted explanation is contradicted by testimony from
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Dr. Rindflesh, Dr. Plenk and co-counsel, James Valdez.3
Rindflesh

testified

that he did

not

receive

any

records or

background information concerning Mr. Gardner from counsel.
236).

Dr.

(H.

Dr. Rindflesh was not asked to testify for Mr. Gardner and

was never given the opportunity to evaluate him in a barrier-free
setting.

(H. 237).

Dr. Agnes Plenk testified that Andrew Valdez and James Valdez
came to her office at The Children's Center to ask her to examine
Mr. Gardner or "speak in his defense."

(H. 258).

However, Dr.

Plenk declined to do so because she had not previously had any
professional contact with Mr. Gardner.

(H. 257).

After the

meeting, which lasted about 20 minutes, Dr. Plenk immediately
communicated her decision to counsel.

(H. 256-57).

James Valdez verified that Dr. Plenk informed them at the end
of the meeting, at least one month before trial, that she would not
evaluate Mr. Gardner or testify.

(H. 203,231).

James Valdez did

not consult with any other doctors after the conversation with Dr.
Plenk.

(H. 203). James Valdez did testify that their contact with

Dr. Heinbecker was delayed because the psychiatrist had only
recently moved to Utah.

(H. 217).

However, this statement was

inaccurate, as Dr. Heinbecker testified that he had arrived in Utah
in July 1984, more than one year before trial. (H. 204).
The State argues that counsel's failure to obtain a timely and
3

Even if the excuse offered by Andrew Valdez was accurate, he
did not ask the trial court to appoint an expert to assist in
presenting mitigation and did not seek to find an expert from
another state, who would not have been affected by negative
publicity. (H. 180)
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thorough assessment of mental health mitigation was reasonable
strategy because experts who were contacted had only unfavorable
evaluations. The district court did not make this finding, and as
explained below, it is not supported by the record.

In addition,

if there were any negative evaluations, they were based on
examinations that were incomplete and unreliable, as outlined
below.

Therefore, based on his review of the testimony and other

evidence, Judge Uno declined to find that counsel's inaction was
strategic.
Andrew Valdez also claimed that the failure to timely obtain
mental health testimony was based on the fact that he had received
evaluations diagnosing Mr. Gardner as sociopathic.

However, when

asked who had provided these diagnoses before Dr. Heinbecker's
evaluation, Mr. Valdez identified only Roger Pray, a Utah State
Prison psychologist, and Dr. Rindflesh.

(H. 179-80).

Mr. Valdez admitted that he didn't "necessarily" accept the
prison psychologist's conclusions and felt it was important to
obtain

an

independent

evaluation.

(H. 123).

Further, Dr.

Rindflesh demonstrated a willingness to cooperate rather than a
reluctance to get involved, and he did not provide a specific
diagnosis in his report.

(Exhibit P-l).

Counsel did not seek any psychological testing before Dr.
Heinbecker's evaluation, and testing was not possible when he did
enter the case, because it was so late in the day.

Counsel

specifically did not arrange to have Mr. Gardner tested for organic
brain syndrome.

(H. 164). Mr. Gardner had been ill with spinal
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meningitis as a child, and he had a history of sniffing inhalants.
(H. 162,164).

Andrew Valdez testified that Dr. Heinbecker told

them organic brain damage was "insignificant".

(H. 164,165).

However, this assertion is contradicted by Dr. Heinbeckerfs
penalty phase testimony.

An indication in early records that Mr.

Gardner had organic brain damage was one of the four factors Dr.
Heinbecker

described

as

important.

(T. 2796).

In cross-

examination, however, the prosecutor and Dr. Heinbecker discussed
whether organic brain syndrome had been concretely diagnosed or was
merely mentioned as a possibility, and Dr. Heinbecker maintained
that sufficient testing had not been conducted in Mr. Gardner's
earlier evaluations.

By questioning Dr. Heinbecker about records

he had not reviewed,

the prosecutor was able to negate the

suggestion that organic brain syndrome could be important.

Dr.

Heinbecker could not point to any current testimony in response
because none had been sought by counsel.
Dr. Heinbecker testified before the district court that the
psychological testing not obtained by counsel, including specific
tests for organic brain syndrome, would have been helpful in
formulating his diagnosis.

(H. 214-15).

These tests should have

been conducted before Mr. Gardner's evaluations by Dr. Rindflesh
and Dr. Heinbecker.

The inaccurate assertion that Dr. Heinbecker

told counsel in the 24 hours before he testified that organic brain
syndrome was "insignificant" does not excuse the failure to timely
obtain an assessment of the disease.
counsel

could

not

adequately

Without this information,

evaluate
24

potential

mitigating

evidence.

In fact, Andrew Valdez did not know, and still does not

understand, how to determine or prove the presence of organic brain
syndrome.

(H. 165).

The district court correctly held that counsel's lack of
preparation

and

investigation

ineffective

presentation

resulted

of mitigation

in

a

haphazard,

evidence

and

was not

reasonable under the circumstances:
"If trial counsel does not adequately investigate the
underlying facts of a case, . . . counsel's performance cannot
fall within the 'wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.'" State v. Templin, 805P. 2d at 188 (citations
omitted).
Trial
evaluated

counsel

did

not

provide

Mr. Gardner with current

the medical

experts

who

test results or critical

information about his background, history and, as a result, their
assessments were not reliable.

An accurate forensic psychiatric

examination requires careful assessment of medical and organic
factors contributing to or causing psychiatric or psychological
dysfunction.

See H. Kaplan and B. Sadock, Comprehensive Textbook

of Psychiatry, 543 (4th ed. 1985).
The recognized method of assessment includes the following
steps:

(1) An accurate medical and social history must be

obtained.

See R. Straub & F. Black, Organic Brain Syndromes 42

(1981); Kaplan & Sadock at 837; (2) Historical data must be
obtained not only from the patient, but from sources independent of
the patient.

Kaplan & Sadock at 488.

See also. American

Psychiatric Association, "Report of the Task Force on the Role of
Psychiatry

in

the

Sentencing

Process,"
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Issues

in

Forensic

Psychiatry 202 (1984); Pollack, Psychiatric Consultation for the
Court, 1 Bull. Am. Acad. Psych. & L. 267, 274 (1974); H. Davison,
Forensic Psychiatry 38-39 (2d ed. 1965); (3) A thorough physical
examination (including neurological examination) must be conducted.
See,

e.g..

Kaplan

& Sadock

at

544, 837-38

& 964; and

(4)

Appropriate diagnostic studies must be undertaken in light of the
history and physical examination.4

These authorities establish

that the standard mental status examination cannot be relied upon
in isolation as a diagnostic tool in assessing the presence or
absence of organic impairment.
Based

on

counsel's

See Kaplan & Sadock, at 835.

unreasonable

failure

to

investigate

mitigating mental health evidence, the district court held that Mr.
Gardner had received ineffective assistance and specifically found
that

prejudice

was

sufficiently

established

under

the

circumstances.5
"The sentencing hearing is counsel's chance to show the jury

The psychiatric profession recognizes that psychological
tests, CT scans, electroencephalograms, and other diagnostic
procedures may be critical to determining the presence or absence
of organic damage.
In cases where a thorough history and
neurological examination still leave doubt as to whether
psychiatric dysfunction is organic in origin, psychological testing
is clearly necessary. See Kaplan & Sadock at 547-48; Pollack at
273.
Moreover, among the available diagnostic instruments for
detecting organic disorders, neuropsychological test batteries have
proven to be critical.
See Filskov & Goldstein, Diagnostic
Validity of the Halstead-Reitan Neuropsychological Battery, 42 J.
of Consulting & Clinical Psych. 382 (1974); Schreiber, Goldman,
Kleinman, Goldfader, & Snow, The Relationship Between Independent
Neuropsychological and Neurological Detection and Localization of
Cerebral Impairment, 162 J. of Nervous and Mental Disease 360
(1976).
5

See Argument X, below.
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that the defendant, despite the crime, is worth saving as a human
being." Mak v. Blodqett. 970 F.2d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 1992). Here,
however, as the district court held, trial counsel did not present
"a cohesive and understandable theory of mitigation."

Memorandum

Decision, at 24.
As it did in the court below, the State contends that "no
attempt was made t explain [organic brain syndrome] or how it
applied to petitioner's case."

(Brief of Appellant, at 14). In

addition, the State complains that Mr. Gardner did not present
evidence that he in fact suffers form organic brain syndrome or
that other mitigating information exists.

The State argues that

any finding or prejudice is only speculative.
However, the State ignores the simple fact that MR. Gardner,
as an indigent person on death row, did not have the money to hire
expert

witnesses and

investigators.

Mr. Gardner

sought the

appointment of experts and investigators necessary to discover and
evaluate mitigating information; the States strenuously opposed all
requests for expert and investigative assistance.

The state's

argument that Mr. Gardner did no produce concrete evidence

—

which could have been presented if he had been provided with
experts and investigators —

is disingenuous at best.

Further, unlike the defendant in the case cited byt eh State,
Mr. Gardner's efforts to show that he was prejudiced did not rest
only on y the claim of "some conceivable impact," and the record
does not demonstrate that he "made no effort to delineate any
prejudice." State v. Lowell, 758 P. 2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988).
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Mr. Gardner's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments and Article 1, § § 7 , 9 and 12 of the Utah
Constitution were violated.6

The district court below correctly

found that he should be provided a new sentencing hearing. As the
State has not demonstrated that the facts found by the court are
clearly erroneous and that its legal conclusions are incorrect,
this Court must affirm the order for resentencing.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT MR. GARDNER
RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON DIRECT APPEAL.
Testimony at the evidentiary hearing established that Mr.

Gardner initially was represented on appeal by the Salt Lake Legal
Defenders Association.

However, as the appeal progressed, Mr.

Gardner was dissatisfied with this representation and requested
that counsel withdraw.

After originally denying Mr. Gardner's

request, the Utah Supreme Court later ordered attorneys from the
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association to withdraw.

Attorney Ed

Brass was appointed to represent Mr. Gardner, but did not receive
copies of the Order appointing him, which broadly defined the scope
of his representation.

(H. 282).

Instead, Mr. Brass believed

based on a telephone conversation with Chief Justice Hall that he
was to proceed only on the issue of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.

(H. 281-82).

Mr. Brass had represented co-defendant Carma Hainsworth in the
6

See State v. Sireci, 536 So.2d 231 (Fla. 1988) (where
court-appointed psychiatrist failed to order necessary testing,
defendant deprived of due process); Mason v. State, 489 So.2d 734
(Fla. 1986) (mental status examination of defendant flawed because
physicians did not know of extensive history of mental disorders).
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trial court, but did not believe that this created a conflict of
interest because her case was completed.

(H. 282-83).

Mr. Brass

prepared a supplemental brief which argued that Mr. Gardner's
ineffective assistance claim was not ripe for review, but did not
raise any additional issues. When the supreme court affirmed Mr.
Gardner's conviction, Mr. Brass did not receive a copy of the
opinion from the supreme court.

(H 284).

Mr. Brass filed a

Petition for Rehearing, although it actually had been prepared by
attorney Joan Watt from the Legal Defenders Association.
86).

(H. 285-

See Exhibit P-2.
These exceptional

circumstances

establish

that

appellate

counsel for Mr. Gardner operated under an actual conflict of
interest, which adversely affected their performance.

The trial

court correctly found that Mr. Gardner did not receive effective,
conflict-free representation on appeal.
U.S.

387

(1985).

See Evitts v. Lucey, 469

The State argues that the district court

misconstrued the circumstances of the Ed Brass appointment and that
there was no deficient performance.

Again, the State does not

discuss the court's findings of fact on this issue, which accord
with the recitation above and are found at page 28 of its
Memorandum Decision, or otherwise support any attempt to establish
that they are clearly erroneous.

The State also claims that Mr.

Gardner was required to show prejudice after the district court
found that he did not receive representation from an independent
advocate.

This argument is contrary to decisions that hold a

showing of Strickland prejudice is not required when an actual
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conflict of interest exists. E. q.. Osborn v. Shillinqer, 861 F. 2d
612 (10th Cir. 1988).

The State also contends that the district

court erred in ordering a new appeal.

Just as a remedy for

ineffective assistance at trial is a new trial, a new appellate
process is the only way to rectify the problem of deficient
representation on appeal. The appropriate remedy here is to allow
an appeal at which Mr. Gardner could be represented by independent
counsel. The fact that claims are now presented in postconviction
is no substitute for independent evaluation of issues on direct
appeal.

Cf. Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1165 (Fla.1985)

(Florida Supreme Court's independent review of records on appeal
does not substitute for effective assistance of appellate counsel,
and petitioner was entitled to a new direct appeal.)

III. MR. GARDNER RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT
TRIAL AND SENTENCING, ON THE GROUNDS ARGUED BELOW IN ADDITION
TO THE SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS FOUND BY THE DISTRICT COURT.
A.
In

Conflicts of Interest
addition

to

the

guarantee

of

reasonably

competent

representation, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel incorporates
the right to counsel's undivided loyalty.

Hollowav v. Arkansas,

435 U.S. 474 (1977); United States v. Burnev, 756 F.2d 787, 790
(10th Cir. 1985); State v. Brown, No. 900148 (Utah November 30,
1992); State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697 (Utah 1980).

To establish a

Sixth Amendment violation based on a conflict of interest, a
defendant who does not object at trial must show that his attorney
actively represented conflicting interests and that an actual
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conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.
However, a further showing of prejudice is not required.

United

States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494 (10th Cir. 1990); State v. Webb, 790
P.2d 65, 73 (Utah 1990).
difficult

to

measure

Prejudice is presumed because "it is

the precise

effect

on

the

defense

of

representation corrupted by conflicting interests." Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. at 692.
Both the Utah Rules of Professional
January

1,

1988,

and

the

previous

Conduct,7

Code

of

effective

Professional

Responsibility8 prohibit Mr. Gardner's representation by Andrew
Valdez and James Valdez because they witnessed events surrounding
his apprehension.

This Court has addressed the advocate-witness

rule in State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650 (Utah 1985).

This Court

recognized in Leonard that:
The great weight of authority, however, is
that it is error for counsel to continue
representation where he or she is or ought to
be a witness with respect to issues that are
not incidental or insignificant. It is widely
recognized that the credibility of an attorney
who acts as a witness in his client's case, as
well as his effectiveness as an attorney in
7

Rule 3.7(a) provides that "A lawyer shall not act as advocate
at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness
except where: (1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case; or (3) Disqualification of the lawyer would
work substantial hardship on the client."
8

DR 5-102(A) precluded a lawyer from serving as an advocate if
the lawyer "learned or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his
firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his client." DR
5-102(B) provided that a lawyer could continue representation as a
potential witness other than on behalf of his client "until it is
apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his
client."
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that case, may be seriously compromised.
***

Experience teaches that the roles of
advocate and witness should be separated. If
an attorney attempts to combine the two roles,
he is likely to be less effective in each
role.
"That counsel should avoid appearing
both as advocate and witness except under
special circumstances is beyond question."
United States v. Morris, 714 F.2d 669, 671
(7th Cir. 1983).
707 P.2d at 653 (Other citations omitted). (Emphasis added.)
Counsel's representation was improper although Andrew Valdez
has stated that his potential testimony might have countered Mr.
Gardner's theory of defense, (H. 137). This conflict similarly was
not excused by James Valdez' explanation that he did not testify
because he didn't believe he "could add anything" to the facts
presented at trial, as he did not know how much time had passed
between the occurrence and his observations of Mr. Gardner, (H.
199).
"A different attorney would be in a better position to assess
the existence and extent of any personal knowledge which [counsel]
may have, and whether he would be of any benefit. . .as a defense
witness." United States v. Seiqner. 498 F.Supp. 282, 286 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
Further, the advocate-witness rule does not depend on whether
counsel will be or is actually called to testify, but rather, "on
whether he 'ought to be called as a witness' in the underlying
action." Groper v. Toff. 717 F.2d 1415, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Per
curiam).

Accord, e.g., United States v. Cannistraro, 794 F. Supp.

1313, 1321 (D. N.J. 1992) ("Prejudice to the client has been found
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when the mere presence of defense counsel at trial would distort
the fact-finding process or when defense counsel would become an
unsworn witness"); United States v. Gotti, 771 F. Supp. 552, 561-63
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (Regardless of whether counsel would be called to
the stand, he could not present defense without acting as an
unsworn witness).
Here, Andrew Valdez recognized that their defense depended on
information from "witnesses who talked to [Mr. Gardner] shortly
after he'd been shot."

(H. 134).

In the defense case, counsel

called Brad Snow, a witness who had observed Mr. Gardner leave the
courthouse and collapse on the lawn outside.

Mr. Snow described

Mr. Gardner's demeanor as "confused," but in cross examination the
prosecutor established that he was approximately 150 feet away. (T.
2475, 2477).

Additionally, James Valdez attempted during cross-

examination of a prosecution witness to introduce facts about his
own conduct at the scene.

(T. 2340).

Bringing this matter to the jury's attention "would cause any
argument to the jury about that testimony to be viewed as a
statement of a witness as well as of an advocate."

United States

v. Iorizzo. 786 F.2d 52, 57 (2nd Cir. 1986); accord. Mannhalt v.
Reed. 847 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1988).
Under

these circumstances,

trial

counsel

were

potential

witnesses and were obligated to withdraw from representation.

The

failure of Mr. Gardner's trial attorneys to recognize their duty to
withdraw resulted in the denial of his right to effective counsel,
and violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
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and the Utah Constitution.
Andrew Valdez and James Valdez also had conflicts of interest
because they knew Nick Kirk, whom Mr. Gardner shot in attempting to
leave the basement, and other witnesses.

James Valdez testified

that they discussed these matters with Mr. Gardner.

"I think

finally, on the record, Ronnie waived, we asked if he was willing
to waive that possibility that we may be witnesses9 or that we knew
individuals, we knew all the courtroom personnel, that sort of
thing."

Mr. Valdez believed that Mr. Gardner waived potential

conflicts, on the record in district court.

(H. 197).

However, the record of the proceedings in district court does
not contain any discussion of the subject or any waiver by Mr.
Gardner.

Andrew Valdez testified that he did not think the fact

that he had been a witness at the scene created a conflict of
interest.

(H. 137-38).

In light of his failure to recognize the

conflict, it is doubtful that he obtained even an off-the-record,
informal waiver from Mr. Gardner.

Counsel had an obligations to

bring these matters to the court's attention.

See Cuvler v.

Sullivan. 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980).
Additionally, there was animosity between Mr. Gardner and
counsel, particularly Andrew Valdez. Andrew Valdez testified that
he

and

Mr.

Gardner

"had

a

lot

of

problems,"

dissatisfaction about confinement conditions.

primarily

(H. 117). At one

point, Mr. Gardner attempted to plead guilty because he believed it
9

James Valdez testified that he was not sure whether or not he
considered being a witness, and that he did contemplate testifying
but "apparently" decided not to do so. (H. 198,199).
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was the only the way to get out of the "hole."

(T. 1088-94).

He

felt that Mr. Valdez was not doing anything to help the confinement
situation. (H. 88). The attorney-client relationship seemed to be
"hot and cold."

(H. 86,117).

According to James Valdez, the

variations in Mr. Gardner's emotional conditions were justifiable,
under the circumstances.

(H. 230).

Mr. Gardner asked counsel to withdraw two times, including on
the Friday before trial started.

(H. 87,127).

This matter

apparently was brought to the attention of the prosecutor and the
trial court, although it does not appear in the record.
judge either denied Mr. Gardner's request
imminent,
counsel.

because

The trial
trial was

or it was withdrawn after further discussion with
(H. 87,127-28).

The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that "Death is
. . . different."

Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).

Capital cases create unique pressures, and it is imperative that
the accused trust in his attorney.

See G. Goodpaster, The Trial

for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.
58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 321, 323 (1983).

Proceeding to trial with a

capital defendant who has just sought counsel's withdrawal is an
untenable situation.

Counsel did not seek a continuance, ensure

that a record of Mr. Gardner's dissatisfaction was preserved or
withdraw so that Mr. Gardner could be represented by lawyers who
did not have a turbulent relationship with him.
In addressing these conflicts, the district court noted that
no record of any waiver had been found.
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Nonetheless, the court

stated that

"the problems regarding the Valdezes representing

petitioner was discussed with petitioner and petitioner waived any
issued of conflict of interest."
With due respect to the district court, this finding is
clearly erroneous as it is unsupported by the records.

The

evidence in support to the finding is testimony from James Valdez
that he thought Mr. Gardner waived any conflict on the records.
(H. 197).

However, James Valdez testimony also demonstrates

uncertainty about whether he even considered

being a witness, let

alone obtaining a valid, informed waiver on the records.
199).

(H. 198,

Andrew Valdez did not even treat his presence at the scene

as a conflict requiring a waiver.

(H. 137-138).

The district court additionally erred in concluding that Mr.
Gardner was not entitled to relief because any conflicts of
interest were outweighed by the fact that "there is no prejudice
beyond a reasonable doubt."

Memorandum Decision, at 24.

As

explained above, a showing of prejudice is not required when an
actual conflict of interest is demonstrated.

This erroneous legal

standard requires reversal of the district court's decision denying
relief on the basis of counsel's conflict of interest.
B.

Inadequate Representation

When a claim of ineffective assistance is not based on a
conflict

of

interest,

reversal

is

required

if

a

defendant

establishes that counsel's performance was deficient and that the
deficiency prejudiced the defense.

The "deficient performance"

prong is satisfied by proof that counsel's representation "fell
36

below an objective standard of reasonableness/1 based on prevailing
professional norms.

Strickland. 466 U.S. at 688; State v. Frame.

723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (Per curiam).

The "prejudice" prong

of the test is met by demonstrating a "reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different."

466 U.S. at 694, 723 P.2d at 405.

The district court rejected Mr. Gardner's additional claims
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial on
the merits.

According to the court below, the State presented

overwhelming

evidence

of Mr. Gardner's

guilt

at

trial, and

therefore he could not be prejudiced by any errors or omissions of
counsel.

The court's ruling on this issue was erroneous, because

there is a reasonable likelihood that jurors would have found Mr.
Gardner guilty only of a lesser offense trial counsel had been
effective advocates.
Throughout its decision below, the district court held that,
although there was some deficiency in counsel's performance, there
was no prejudice because of the weight of the direct evidence of
guilt.

Memorandum Decision, at 14.

The court then ruled on

specific grounds asserted by Mr. Gardner that, "the deficiency was
not prejudicial beyond a reasonable doubt."
Decision at 19, 21, 23, 26.

E. q.. Memorandum

The district court applied a clearly

erroneous legal standard in requiring Mr. Gardner to show beyond a
reasonable doubt the result would have been different but for
counsel's errors and omissions.
Counsel did not effectively investigate and present
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the

defense that Mr. Gardner did not intend to kill Michael Burdell and
that the scooting was "essentially a reaction, a reaction after
having been shot."

(H. 131). No reasonable explanation has been

provided for the failure to clarify for jurors that Mr. Gardner
suffered a wound to his chest and lung, rather than simply to his
shoulder. Throughout the trial, witnesses referred inaccurately to
Mr. Gardner's "shoulder" wound and counsel did not correct this
error.

Counsel further perpetuated this mischaracterization by

referring to a shoulder wound in briefs filed in the direct appeal.
Counsel also failed to investigate whether ballistics evidence
was available to support the defense. At the trial, counsel crossexamined Raymond Cooper in an attempt to explore the impact of the
shot.

Mr. Cooper testified that he could not discuss this matter

because his expertise was in firearms identification rather than
ballistics.

(T. 1157-59).

Counsel did not call any witnesses or

present any evidence on this issue.

It is clear from counsel's

testimony before the district court that there was no strategic
reason for this omission.10

Ballistics testimony would have been

significant,

by

as

indicated

the

fact

that

counsel

sought

unsuccessfully to elicit information from a witness not qualified
on that topic.

The district court agreed that there was "some"

10

Andrew Valdez testified that he "believed" he talked to
a ballistics expert, who "probably would have been Ed Barton," an
investigator in the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association. (H.
133,135).
However, Mr. Valdez could not remember whether Mr.
Barton provided a report or why the defense did not present
testimony from an expert in ballistics. (H. 134,135,136). James
Valdez testified that he could not remember whether they sought
ballistics testing, and said "I don't think we thought it was a
question of ballistics." (H. 226-27).
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deficiency
adequately.

in

counsel's

failure

to

present

their

defense

However, the court found that there was no prejudice

because of the extent of direct evidence showing Mr. Gardner's
guilt.

However,

this evaluation necessarily

is affected by

counsel's failure to competently present their defense.

The

district court erred in concluding that Mr. Gardner suffered no
prejudice.
Counsel's decision that Mr. Gardner should testify in the
trial on the merits also was not reasonably competent.

Counsel

believed that Mr. Gardner's prior convictions would be admitted to
impeach if he were to testify and knew that jurors "would have a
totally

different

happened.

picture

(H. 148).

of Ronnie

Lee

Gardner"

once

that

They additionally were aware that the

prosecution would offer the testimony of Corrections Officer
Jorgensen in rebuttal if Mr. Gardner testified.

(H. 151-52).

Counsel also knew that Mr. Gardner would refuse to disclose the
name of the woman who handed him the gun on the morning of April 2,
1985, and that his refusal "was going to hurt."

(H. 155).

In the hearing, Mr. Gardner said that he was reluctant to
testify because his prior convictions would then be admitted.
89).

(H.

Although Andrew Valdez testified that Mr. Gardner wanted to

take the stand, he also admitted that Mr. Gardner "may have had
reservations at one point," and that "there was days" when Mr.
Gardner did not want to testify.

(H. 147). Mr. Gardner believes

that he was coerced into testifying, because his brother was asked
by Andrew Valdez to write to him and urge him to take the stand.
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(H. 90-92,158).

Counsel acted unreasonably in deciding that Mr.

Gardner

testify

should

and

exerting

pressure

to

gain

his

acquiescence.
Near

the

beginning

of Mr. Gardner's

testimony,

counsel

elicited the information that he had been convicted of numerous
felonies, including two robberies, attempted escape, burglary, two
aggravated

assaults

and

homicide.11

(T.

1186-87).

At

the

evidentiary hearing, Andrew Valdez testified that this was an
attempt to "steal the thunder" by disclosing Mr. Gardner's record
before it was admitted by the prosecution to impeach his testimony.
(H. 149).

If these convictions were admissible to impeach Mr.

Gardner, trial counsel's decision would have been reasonable.
However, these convictions were inadmissible under Rule 609 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule

609

provides

that

a defendant's

testimony

can

be

impeached with evidence that he has been convicted of a crime which
"involved dishonesty or false statement," or a felony not involving
dishonesty or false statement only if "the court determines that
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect."

State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986);

State v. Gentry. 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987).

In the absence of a

showing of specific facts indicative of fraudulent action, the
crimes of theft, second degree burglary and robbery ordinarily do
not involve dishonesty or false statement.

n

State v. Bruce, 779

In cross-examination, the prosecutor brought up an additional
conviction for escape. (T. 1214).
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P.2d 646 (Utah 1989); State v. Lanier. 778 P.2d 9 (Utah 1989);
State v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1093 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Wight. 765
P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1988).

The prior convictions elicited by

counsel therefore were not admissible under this part of Rule 609.
If the prosecution had sought admission under the other clause
in the rule, it would have had to establish that the probative
value

of

each

conviction

outweighed

its prejudicial

impact.

Because the nature of Mr. Gardner's convictions are not probative
of his character for veracity and they were similar to the offenses
for which he was on trial, so as to be extremely prejudicial,
admission of these convictions over an objection would have been an
abuse of discretion.
Gardner's

prior

Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1037-38.

convictions

were

inadmissible,

Because Mr.

there was no

strategic or tactical reason for their introduction in his direct
examination.

(H. 168). See State v. Morehouse. 748 P. 2d 217, 220-

221, (Ut. App. 1988) (Jackson,J. dissenting) cited with approval in
Bruce. 779 P. 2d at 656. The district court denied relief on this
ground because it ruled that Utah law at the time of Mr. Gardner's
trial allowed introduction of his felony history for impeachment
purposes.

Memorandum Decision, at 17.

This legal conclusion is

erroneous.
Although Banner and Gentry had not been decided, Rule 609 had
been in effect since for two years at the time of Mr. Gardner's
trial. The rule's departure from the former practice of admitting
all felony convictions to impeach was signaled in the Advisory
Committee Note, which stated that "This rule is the federal rule,
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verbatim, and changes Utah law by granting the court discretion in
convictions not involving dishonesty or false statement to refuse
to admit the evidence if it would be prejudicial to the defendant.
Current

Utah

Treatises

law mandates

interpreting

provided

a

framework

the
for

the

admission

identical
arguing

of

federal

that

Mr.

such evidence."
provision

also

Gardner's

prior

convictions were not admissible to impeach under Rule 609.

E.g.,

M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence. §§ 609.2, 609.4 (1981); 3
D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence. § 316 (1979).
Mr. Gardner also was prejudiced by counsel's failure to
request

a

bifurcated

circumstance

based

procedure

to deal

on prior convictions.

with

an

One of

aggravating
the three

statutory aggravating circumstances to be proved at trial was the
allegation that Mr. Gardner "was previously convicted of.. .a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to a person."
Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(h).

Utah Code

When this aggravating circumstance is

asserted, it is error to introduce evidence of any alleged prior
convictions in the guilt phase, before the jury has determined
whether the accused is guilty of an intentional or knowing killing.
A bifurcated procedure is required to alleviate prejudice to the
accused.

State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 458 (Utah 1989); State v.

James. 767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989).
Although Florez and James were decided after Mr. Gardner's
trial,

counsel should have been alerted to the prejudicial impact

of admitting prior convictions under § 76-5-202(1)(h). As the Utah
Supreme Court recognized in James, bifurcated proceedings had been
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required in other contexts "to insure that such prejudice based
upon a defendant's 'status1 as a previously convicted felon will
not taint a jury's fact finding task."

767 P.2d

at 556.

Counsel's unreasonable decision that Mr. Gardner should testify,
their introduction of his prior convictions and their failure to
request a bifurcated proceeding were errors which intensified each
other's effect and prejudiced Mr. Gardner.
The district court recognized that Mr. Gardner's contentions
on these issues were "very strong". Memorandum Decision, at p. 18.
However, the court ruled, "Again, based on the strength of the
direct evidence regarding petitioner's guilt, the Court finds that
assistance of counsel may represent some deficiency in the above
facts, but rules that the deficiency was not prejudicial beyond a
reasonable doubt."

Memorandum Decision, at p. 19.

The court

erroneously applied the reasonable doubt standard to the Strickland
prejudice prong, which correctly requires Mr. Gardner to show only
a "reasonable probability" of a different outcome.

This Court

should remand these issues back to the district court, with
instructions to apply the correct and more lenient definition of
prej udice.
IV.

MR. GARDNER'S CONVICTION MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE IT WAS BASED
ON HYPNOTICALLY ENHANCED TESTIMONY.
Hypnotically enhanced testimony is inadmissible in Utah,

because its "inherent unreliability . . .

is well established."

State v. Tuttle. 780 P.2d 1203, 1210 (Utah 1989); accord. State v.
Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989).
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See also. Rock v. Arkansas.

483 U.S. 44, 59-60 (1987).

The Arizona Supreme Court, which this

Court has cited with approval on the issue, has summarized:
(1) The subject under hypnosis is extremely
susceptible to suggestions given intentionally
or unintentionally by the hypnotist or others
present during the session.
The source of
suggestions could be verbal or nonverbal cues
given by the hypnotist of which even the
hypnotist is unaware.
(2) The subject is likely to confabulate by
filling in details of memory gaps to make his
account of events more logical, complete, and
acceptable. Additionally, it is impossible
for either the subject or a hypnosis expert to
determine whether a given piece of information
is actual memory or confabulation, absent
independent verification such as a record of
the subject's pre-hypnotic recall.
(3) The subject may confound memories evoked
under hypnosis with prior recall. Thus, it
becomes impossible to distinguish between
memories of impressions existing before
hypnosis and memories of impressions generated
during hypnosis.
(4) The subject of hypnosis develops
distorting desire to please the hypnotist.

a

(5) The subject of hypnosis generally becomes
absolutely confident in the accuracy of his
recall, thereby unfairly impairing effective
cross-examination of the subject about the
event.
(6) The subject loses critical judgment
because he is willing to speculate and then
give credence to such speculation.
State ex rel. Neelv v. Sherrill. 799 P.2d 849, 852-53 (Ariz. 1990)
(Citations omitted).
In Tuttle, this Court held that a witness who has been
hypnotized may testify, but his or her testimony must be limited to
"prehypnotic recall as it has been recorded before hypnosis."
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780

P.2d at 1211. The scope of testimony from a previously hypnotized
witness should be determined prior to trial.

780 P.2d at 1211,

n.10. Additionally, testimony deviating from recorded prehypnotic
recall may be stricken and expert testimony could also be admitted
to explain the witness's unwarranted confidence in the improper
testimony

and

"recollection."

the

unreliability

of

the

post-hypnotic

780 P.2d at 1212.

In the instant case, Robert Macri was a crucial witness. Mr.
Macri was in the basement archives room when Mr. Gardner attempted
to escape from prison officers at about 9 a.m. on April 2, 1985.
Mr. Macri and Michael Burdell hid behind the door from the foyer
into the archives room.

Mr. Gardner entered the room and walked

past them, then turned. Mr. Gardner shot Mr. Burdell, who had been
hiding closest to the hinge of the door, and Mr. Macri left the
room by going around the door, which was swinging shut or had been
closed.
In the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Macri testified that he had
been uncertain about how the door had closed.

(H. 26). During the

summer of 1985, Mr. Macri and his wife were receiving marriage
counseling from Dr. Elliott Landau. Because Mr. Macri was under a
lot of pressure and "really mystified," Dr. Landau placed him under
hypnosis to help him recall what had happened.

(H. 27). At the

end of this session, which probably occurred in August 1985, (H.
27), Dr. Landau gave Mr. Macri a posthypnotic suggestion that he
would continue to think about the matter until he resolved the
issue.

(H. 28-29).

At some later time, as Mr. Macri and a friend
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were driving to California, "all of the sudden I saw that I had
used the door as a shield and had pulled it closed behind me." (H.
29).
Mr. Macri explained that his trial testimony reflected this
understanding and therefore differed from his preliminary hearing
testimony.

(H. 29).

At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Macri

testified that the door started to close, he began to go around it
and he heard the shot "practically simultaneously."
964).

(T. 960-61,

Mr. Macri also stated that the gun was pointed at his head

when Mr* Burdell said "Oh, my God."

Then, "I just ducked.

For no

reason at all, I ducked and went around the swinging door, and the
gun went off."

Mr. Macri was "coming around the door" when the

shot was fired.

(T. 949). At trial, Mr. Macri testified that he

was holding the door and keeping it from closing. According to his
testimony, Mr. Gardner walked past them, turned, and pointed the
gun at him.

(T. 2215).

Mr. Macri testified that Mr. Burdell said

"Oh, my God," Mr. Gardner moved the gun and:
When it got to the point exactly between Mike
and myself—which was 18 inches, at the most,
the space between us—when he got to just the
halfway point, I ducked and went out the door
as I believe that I was holding the door at
that time.
I was keeping the door from
closing.
(T. 2217).
These two versions differed materially. Mr. Maori's testimony
at the preliminary hearing supported the theory that the shooting
of Mr. Burdell was not an intentional killing, because the rt?fmse
could argue that Mr. Gardner, who was bleeding from a gunshot wound
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in the chest, had been startled when the door suddenly began to
close and Mr. Macri moved out.

However, the trial testimony

indicates that Mr. Gardner was already moving the gun toward Mr.
Burdell when Mr. Macri let go of the door and it began to close.
As was the evidence in Tuttle and Mitchell. Mr. Macrifs
hypnotically

enhanced testimony was truly unreliable and was

inadmissible as a matter of Utah evidentiary law.

The district

court below erred in concluding that Mr. Gardner's trial was not
affected

by the use of post-hypnotic

testimony.

The court

erroneously speculated that the change in Mr. Macri's testimony was
caused by something other than his hypnosis session.
Decision, at 6.

Memorandum

Additionally, the district court mistakenly

concluded that Mr. Macri was not an important witness and that his
testimony was merely cumulative.
Additionally, although this Court in Tuttle did not decide
whether the use of hypnotically enhanced testimony can violate a
defendant's due process and confrontation rights, 780 P.2d at 1213,
other courts have determined

the existence of constitutional

violations on a case-by-case basis.

E.g.. Bundy v. Dugger, 850

F.2d 1402, 1415 (11th Cir. 1988); Harker v. State of Maryland. 800
F.2d 437 (4th Cir. 1986).

In the instant case, any lack of

knowledge that Mr. Macri's testimony was hypnotically enhanced
merely exacerbates these constitutional violations.
Dr. Landau testified that Mr. Macri's was hypnotized without
the safeguards normally expected in a hypnosis session conducted
for

forensic

purposes,

which

include
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obtaining

sufficiently

detailed information about prehypnotic recall and video and audio
tapes of the session itself. (H. 60).

The absence of these

precautionary measures made Mr. Macri's hypnotically enhanced
testimony particularly untrustworthy.

Further, if trial counsel

were not aware at the time of trial that Mr. Macri had been
hypnotized, then their ability to effectively cross-examine him was
frustrated.

Jurors were not informed that Mr. Macri had been

hypnotized and were not aware of his explanation for the change in
his testimony.

There was no expert testimony to analyze the

hypnosis session itself, or to describe the effects of hypnosis.
The use of this testimony therefore did not comport with due
process of law, and violated Mr. Gardner's right to confront the
witnesses against him. U.S. Const., Am. VI, XIV; Utah Const., Art.
1/ §§ 7, §12.

Mr. Gardner's conviction and sentence must be

vacated unless the State establishes that this error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.

Even under the evidentiary standard

announced in Mitchell and Tuttle, reversal is required because, in
the absence of this testimony, there was a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable result in either the guilt or penalty phase of
trial.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADVISE MR. GARDNER OF
HIS RIGHTS TO TESTIFY OR REMAIN SILENT.
The district court below erroneously rejected Mr. Gardner's

contention that an advisement concerning his right to testify or
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remain silent should have been given by the trial court.12 Because
these two corollary rights are fundamental and personal privileges,
see,

e.g.,

Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44

(1987);

Brooks v.

Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972); Mallov v. Hoqan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964),
their waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent.
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

Johnson

To make an effective decision

about whether or not to testify, and thereby validly waive the
right to testify or to remain silent, the accused should be advised
of

these

rights,

of

the consequences

of

testifying

or not

testifying, and of the fact that the decision is his to make
notwithstanding counsel's advice.
An advisement from the trial court is necessary to protect
against the possibility that counsel will undermine or supplant the
defendant's decision whether to take the stand or decline to
testify.

See People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984).

The

instant case demonstrates the need for an adequate advisement from
the court:

Mr. Gardner felt that counsel coerced him into

testifying at trial, although he personally did not want to do so.
(H. 89, 90).

Here, an adequate advisement from the trial judge

would have alleviated the effect of counsel's undue pressure
coercion on Mr. Gardner, and was necessary to protect his rights
under the state and federal constitutions.

U.S. Const, Am. VI,

VIII, and XIV; Utah Const., §§ 7, 9 and 12.

The record does not contain an advisement on these
issues, although Valdez testified that the trial court informed Mr.
Gardner of matters concerning his right to testify. (H. 154).
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VI.

MR. GARDNER'S RIGHT TO PRESENCE WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL
COURT CONDUCTED PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CAPITAL CASE
WHILE HE WAS ABSENT.
The due process right of the accused to be present during

judicial

proceedings

is one of

the most

guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

fundamental

rights

See, e.g., Diaz v.

United States. 223 U.S. 442, 447-48 (1912); Lewis v. United States,
146 U.S. 370 (1892); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884).
Recently, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the continuing
validity of this right:
The Court has assumed that, even in situations where the
defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or
evidence against him, he has a due process right "to be
present in his own person whenever his presence has a
relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his
opportunity to defend against the charge." Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 ... (1934). Although
the Court has emphasized that this privilege of presence
is not guaranteed "when presence would be useless, or the
benefit but a shadow," ... at 106-07, ... due process
clearly requires that a defendant be allowed to be
present "to the extent that a fair and just hearing would
be thwarted by his absence," ... at 108, .... Thus, a
defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any
stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its
outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness
of the procedure.
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987). A defendant's right
to presence also is recognized in Article I, § 12 of the Utah
Constitution.

State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677 (Utah 1986).

Prior to trial in the instant case, the trial court conducted
a hearing on co-defendant Carma Hainsworth's Motion for Recusal in
the absence of Mr. Gardner and counsel, and the ruling on Mr.
Gardner's corresponding motion was entered without a hearing and in
his absence. (T. 1118). Mr. Gardner did not waive his right to be
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present when this important motion was considered.

Additionally,

exhibits submitted to support a Motion for Change of Venue were
reviewed by the court without Mr. Gardner and counsel.

(T. 1205).

The right to presence has special importance in a capital
proceeding.

See Proffitt v. Wainwricrht, 685 P.2d 1227 (11th Cir.

1982), modified on reh'g, 706 F.2d 311 (11th Cir. 1983).
violation

of

this

fundamental

constitutional

right

A

requires

reversal unless the State establishes that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.

See State v. Codianna, 573 P.2d 343,

348-49 (Utah 1977); People v. Campbell. 785 P.2d 153 (Colo. App.
1989).
The district court below held that Mr. Gardner's right to be
present at all critical stages of the proceeding was "substantially
observed."

Memorandum Decision, at 11.

Additionally, the court

held that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Mr.

Gardner respectfully contends that the district court erred in
reaching these conclusions.
VII. THE SENTENCING PROCEEDING WAS UNRELIABLE BECAUSE JURORS
WERE ALLOWED TO CONSIDER IMPERMISSIBLE INFORMATION ABOUT
THE VICTIM, MICHAEL BURDELL.
In a capital case, the accused's "punishment must be tailored
to his personal responsibility and moral guilt."
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).

Enmund v.

While Mr. Gardner's direct

appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided that
this principle
introduced

was violated

evidence

when

concerning

the prosecution
the

argued

victim's

characteristics, the emotional impact of the killing
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or

personal
on the

victim's family and the opinions of family members about the crime
and the defendant.

South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 109 S.Ct.

2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989); Booth v. Maryland. 482 U.S. 496
(1987).
However, in 1991, the Court reconsidered the issue and held
that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a state from allowing
victim impact evidence in a capital sentencing hearing.

Payne v.

Tennessee. Ill S.Ct. 2597 (1991). Notwithstanding this reversal by
the Payne court, this Court should apply the reasoning of Booth and
Gathers, and hold that the use of victim impact evidence in a
capital proceeding is impermissible under the Utah Constitution.
In Mr. Gardner's case, Bob Macri testified that he knew Mr.
Burdell very well and that "He had a radio program where he did
public service work."

(T. 2207).

In the trial on the merits, the

prosecutor argued in closing that:
Isn't it unfortunate we hear so little about
the victim of the crime? You got to see his
picture, but you really didn't get to see
Michael Burdell. You didn't get to meet this
man, did you?
Well, we know that Michael
Burdell was a human being with life's
pleasures, with life's challenges and with
life's opportunities before him, he had a life
that contributed and would have contributed.
We know he was a lawyer. We know he did pro
bono work, and we know just before he was
killed he was in that archives room joking and
kibitzing with his associates.
I think, above everything else, the most
poignant statement made in this whole trial
was made by Bob Macri. Remember he said, the
reason I was i just a bad state afterwards and
falling apart wasn't because I was frightened,
no, it was because I felt a tremendous
sadness. My friend was now dead.
Michael
Burdell had a right to live. He had a right
to contribute. He had a right to continue to
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joke and kibitz with his friends.
right to live.
(T. 2533-34).

He had a

The prosecutor then reminded jurors that they were

representatives of the community.

(T. 2534).13

At the same time,

Mr. Gardner was prevented from countering the effect of this
improper evidence and argument with testimony that Mr. Burdell's
relatives and friends did not want a death sentence to be imposed,
and that Mr. Burdell would have opposed such a punishment, (.51).
The unacceptable risk that victim impact evidence will produce an
arbitrary decision therefore was enhanced in Mr. Gardner's case,
because jurors received a distorted picture of the impact of the
crime on Mr. Burdell's relatives and friends.
The Utah Constitution has been interpreted by this Court to
provide greater protection in capital cases than that required by
the federal Bill of Rights. See State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71 (Utah),
cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982). See also State v. Andrews, No.
920308 and No. 920309 (Utah July 21, 1992)(J. Durham dissenting).
Precluding victim impact evidence and argument is compelled by this
Court's recognition that death is different, and the need for
heightened reliability in capital punishment decisions.

Although this argument occurred in the trial on the
merits rather than the penalty phase, jurors were specifically
instructed that they could consider evidence presented during the
guilt phase. (T. 613). Additionally, jurors were instructed that
they could consider sympathy and sentiment in determining Mr.
Gardner's punishment. (T. 617). This instruction was not limited
to sympathy for Mr. Gardner associated with mitigating evidence,
but could have been read to include sympathy for the victim, Mr.
Burdell, and Mr. Macri.
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VIII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT
JURORS
ON
ALL
STATUTORY
MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES.

One of the fundamental principles of capital punishment
jurisprudence emphasizes the importance of mitigating evidence.
Under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, jurors in a capital
sentencing proceeding may "not be precluded from considering as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."

Lockett v.

Ohio. 438 U.S. 586 (1976); accord, e.g.. Penrv v. Lvnauqh. 492 U.S.
302 (1989); Mills v. Maryland. 486 U.S. 367 (1988); Eddinas v.
Oklahoma. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
Under

Utah's

capital

punishment

scheme,

"[m]itigating

circumstances shall include, [inter alia, the fact that "The
defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2)(c).

In the instant case, the penalty phase instructions given by
the trial court omitted a definition of this subsection (2)(c)
mitigating circumstance.14

The failure to include the subsection

(2)(c) mitigating circumstance in jury instructions deprived Mr.
Gardner of his right to have jurors consider and give effect to all
mitigating evidence presented at trial.
Although the circumstances in this case did not show that
14

The circumstances in subsections (a) and (f) also were
omitted, but apparently were withdrawn by counsel, according to the
trial judge's notation on an instruction tendered by the defense.
(T. 535).
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another person was coercing Mr. Gardner into his actions at the
time of the offense, the jury reasonably could have determined that
he was in a state of physical duress, as that term is popularly
understood.15

Mr.

Gardner's

construction

of

the

(2)(c)

mitigating is appropriate in light of the fundamental principle
that mitigating circumstances must be broadly interpreted in favor
of the defendant.

See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S.

1 (1986).
In the proceedings below, the district court agreed with the
State that the instructions given at trial allowed jurors to
consider Mr. Gardner's physical condition as mitigating evidence.
Memorandum Decision, at 30-31. According to the State, during the
trial on the merits, Mr. Gardner had presented evidence of his
physical condition, and the jury was instructed in the penalty
phase that it could consider "any other fact in mitigation of the
penalty."
It is true that Mr. Gardner had attempted in the trial on the
merits to present the defense that the physical effects of the
gunshot wound he received prevented him from forming the mental
state necessary for conviction of first degree murder. However, in
the penalty phase, jurors were instructed that they were not to
consider any residual doubts as to Mr. Gardner's guilt.
13).

(T. 612-

The harm caused by the failure to instruct on subsection (c)

The word "duress" is synonymous, inter alia, with the
words "force" and "stress." See, W. Burton, Legal Thesaurus. P.
191 (1980). Clearly, force or stress could come from a physical
source.
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was exacerbated rather than alleviated.
Further, the general instruction that jurors could consider
any other fact in mitigation was not an effective substitute for a
charge

in

accordance

with

subsection

(2)(c).

This

general

instruction did not provide specific guidance or direction that
jurors could consider Mr. Gardner's physical condition during the
shooting as a reason to show mercy.
Jurors

were

unconstitutionally

precluded

from

giving

mitigating effect to the fact that Mr. Gardner had been shot in the
chest

immediately

before

killing

Mr.

Burdell.

The

jury's

sentencing decision therefore was constitutionally unreliable.
U.S. Const., Am. VIII and XIV; Utah Const., Art. I, §§ 7 and 9.
IX.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING AN INSTRUCTION THAT
WOULD HAVE INFORMED JURORS THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD TO
ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
In the penalty phase of trial, the trial court refused to give

the following instruction offered by Mr. Gardner:
Before you consider any fact as an aggravating
circumstance, you must find that that fact has
been established by the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt. You may not consider any
for choosing to impose the death sentence
unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt (and to a moral certainty) that that
fact is true.
(T. 532). This instruction was necessary to adequately channel the
jury's discretion and ensure that the punishment decision was
reliable.

U.S. Const., Am. VIII and XIV; Utah Const., Art. I, §§

7 and 9.
In Utah, before a death sentence, can be ordered,
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the

prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the totality
of evidence of aggravating circumstances outweighs the totality of
evidence

of

mitigating

appropriate punishment.

circumstances

and

that

death

is the

State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah), cert.

denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).

In the district court below, the

State agreed that the Wood decision implied a need for a finding as
to the existence of aggravation.
In requiring jurors to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances and
that death is the appropriate punishment, the Wood opinion exceeds
what has been mandated in some other states for the imposition of
a death sentence.

In creating additional protections, this Court

recognized that imposing the death penalty is "the most solemn and
final act that the state can take against an individual." 648 P.2d
at 80. Because the decision to impose the death penalty laws must
occur judiciously and fairly, the guarantees inherent in due
process of law must apply to the capital sentencing proceeding.
648 P.2d at 80-81.

The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable

doubt is a fundamental component of due process.

In re Winship,

397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Other jurisdictions have declined to follow Wood because of a
belief that "While the existence of an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance is a fact susceptible to proof under a reasonable
doubt standard, the relative weight is not."
696

F.2d

804,

818

(11th

Cir.

1983)

Ford v. Strickland,

(Citations

omitted).

Significantly, some jurisdictions not requiring a Wood instruction
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on weighing do apply the reasonable doubt standard to the proof or
existence of aggravating circumstances.

E.g., State v. Simants,

250 N.W.2d 881, 888 (Neb. 1977).
The existence of aggravating circumstances must be established
before they can be weighed against mitigating circumstances.

The

fact finding function in a trial on the merits is analogous to
determining the existence of aggravating circumstances, and the
standard of proof should be applied.

See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d

at 84, n.10; see also. Lewis v. Jeffers. 110 S.Ct. 3092 (1990).
Moreover, this Court has stated explicitly that "The State has
the burden of proof as to the existence of aggravating factors and
must show that they 'outweigh' the mitigating factors."
Holland,

777

P. 2d

Additionally,

1019,

1025

"A jury must

(Utah

1989)

State v.

(Emphasis

added).

first determine the existence of

aggravating factors before it can determine their weight."

State

v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275, 1280 (Utah 1989).
Although the need for the instruction requested by Mr. Gardner
flows directly from State v. Wood, the district court declined to
grant postconviction relief based on the trial court's refusal to
give it. According to the district court, the trial court properly
refused

the

instruction

because

this

was

a

"previously

unarticulated basis for challenging a death sentence in Utah."
Memorandum Decision, at 31. The language requested by Mr. Gardner
was compelled by the logic and reasoning of Wood, in spite of the
fact

that

no

instruction.

Utah

appellate

court

had

required

a

similar

The district court erred in concluding that the
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instruction was not necessary.

X.

MR. GARDNER'S RIGHTS TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL,
TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND TO A FAIR HEARING HAVE BEEN VIOLATED
BY THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO APPOINT AN INVESTIGATOR AND
EXPERT WITNESSES TO ASSIST MR. GARDNER; THE REFUSAL TO PROVIDE
THIS ASSISTANCE IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINT ON MR.
GARDNER'S ABILITY TO PRESENT HIS CASE.
At all times during the postconviction proceeding below, Mr.

Gardner has asserted that he is entitled to the assistance of
investigators and expert witnesses to help him present his case.
Particularly, Mr. Gardner has argued that this assistance is
crucial to his efforts to demonstrate that trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance. However, as the district court found, the
State

vigorously

opposed

Mr.

Gardner's

requests

and

they,

therefore, were denied.
Nevertheless, the State argued below and now contends in this
Court that Mr. Gardner should not receive a new sentencing hearing
or a new appeal because he has not demonstrated the prejudice
required by the second prong of the Strickland v. Washington test.
The district court recognized the inherent unfairness in the
State's argument, and the "Catch-22" Mr. Gardner now faces.
Memorandum Decision, at P.24.
A defendant's right to the assistance of a competent mental
health expert to assist in his defense is so fundamental and so
important that it is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Ake

v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985); Smith v. McCormick. 914 F.2d
1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts have "recognized a particularly
critical interrelation between expert psychiatric assistance and
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minimally effective assistance of counsel."

United States v.

Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154, 1163 (5th Cir. 1974).

The need for

investigative assistance also is clearly established. The district
court recognized

the necessity of the assistance Mr. Gardner

sought, but accepted the State's arguments that Utah statutes
precluded providing defense assistance in postconviction.

As

argued in Mr. Gardner's Motion for Appointment of Investigator and
Experts, the court's conclusion was incorrect.
The failure to provide essential assistance here has violated
Mr. Gardner's rights to due process, to meaningful access to the
courts and to equal protection of the law and has precluded a full
and fair hearing on Mr. Gardner's postconviction claims.

60

CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons

and

authorities, Mr. Gardner

respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
decision to grant him a new sentencing hearing and new direct
appeal.

Mr. Gardner requests the Court to reverse the denial of

relief on all other grounds.

Respectfully submitted this X X

day of January, 1993.
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